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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago the first Feminism and Legal Theory (“FLT”) 
workshop was held at the University of Wisconsin Law School.  Begun 
initially as a summer program, the FLT Project provided a supportive 
forum for a variety of scholars from different disciplines who were 
interested in gender and law.  Papers from the early sessions of the 
FLT workshops became a part of the very first feminist legal theory 
anthology, At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory.1 
In the intervening years a lot has transpired.  The FLT Project 
continues to hold summer sessions, along with workshops and 
“uncomfortable conversations” each semester.  We have moved well 
beyond, while not totally abandoning, the earlier preoccupation with 
issues of primary concern to women, such as domestic violence and 
reproductive freedom.  Today, the FLT Project is as invested in its 
“Corporations and Capitalism” working group as it is in working with 
scholars who are engaging in path-breaking work on care and 
dependency. 
Of course, when we speak of feminism, it is necessary to clearly state 
that there are many differences within feminism – difference in 
approach, emphasis, and objectives – that make sweeping 
generalizations difficult.  Recognizing that there are many 
divergences in feminist theory, it is nonetheless possible to make 
some generalizations.  Feminism is not anchored in any one 
                                                          
∗ Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Director of Feminism & Legal Theory 
Project, Emory University School of Law. 
1. AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991) [hereinafter BOUNDARIES]. 
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discipline.  It presents a theory of gender and challenges the 
assertions and assumptions of gender-neutrality and objectivity in 
received disciplinary knowledge.  Often credited with inserting the 
“woman question” into disciplinary dialogue, feminism has broadened 
and complicated the traditional framework of a variety of disciplines.2  
Because gender is theoretically relevant to almost all human 
endeavors, it is also relevant to almost all disciplines.3 
I.  FEMINISMS AND FEMINISTS 
Because feminism as a discipline focuses on the significance of 
gender and the societal inequality resulting from values and 
assumptions based on gender, feminist scholars are found in all 
disciplines.  As a group, feminists are concerned with the implications 
of historic and contemporary exploitation of women within society, 
seeking the empowerment of women and the transformation of 
institutions dominated by men.  In addition, many feminists also use 
distinctive feminist methods to bring women’s experiences to the 
foreground, such as consciousness raising or storytelling.4  Such 
methods recognize the validity and importance of women’s 
experiences and ground feminist theory and research. 
One important characteristic of feminism is that it represents the 
integration of practice and theory.  As noted by historian Linda 
Gordon, feminism is “an analysis of women’s subordination for the 
purpose of figuring out how to change it.”5 The recognized 
desirability of this practical aspect has made many feminists gravitate 
toward law and legal reform as objects of study and action.  They have 
had many successes within law.  In fact, it is fair to state that feminism, 
along with economics and, to some extent, psychology, has had a 
visible and immediate impact on law over the past several decades.  
The effect is apparent not only in the academic and in legal 
                                                          
2. See, e.g., KEITH E. MELDER, BEGINNINGS OF SISTERHOOD: THE AMERICAN 
WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1800-1850, at 95-96 (1977) (discussing the emergence of 
the “woman question” within the abolitionist movement, while raising questions 
about the nature and function of gender). 
3. See BOUNDARIES, supra note 1, at xv (“Disagreements [within the feminist 
community] aside, however, it seems clear to me that feminist legal theory has lessons 
for all of society, not just for women or legal scholars.  Ultimately, it is the members of 
our audience that will judge the effectiveness of our individual and collective 
voices.”). 
4. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 10 (1999) 
(noting that feminist legal theorists frequently use narratives of battered women in 
researching domestic violence). 
5. Linda Gordon, The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of 
Feminism, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 107 n.1 
(Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 1979). 
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scholarship, but in the doctrine employed by courts and developed by 
legislative bodies.6  The very institutions of law have been assessed 
and, occasionally, revised in the light of feminist insights and 
arguments. 
The fact that feminism has had an impact is not surprising given 
the huge influx of women into law schools beginning in the 1970s.7  
While there were women in law schools prior to this period, their 
numbers have increased significantly during this time.  Further, 
women have been integrated into the profession at all levels.8  In the 
first wave of women to attend law school, many were explicitly 
interested in a feminist political agenda.  They came to law schools 
with the mantra that “the personal is the political” ringing resolutely 
in their ears.9  They were interested in reform and the role that law 
would play in the project of engineering a more gender-equal society.  
These early feminists were optimistic about using law to attain gender 
equality. 
The strategies of early legal feminist reformers were varied and 
their perspectives were not always compatible.  One basic divide that 
emerged early in the articulation of a legal approach to feminist 
theory is still significant today—the issue of gender difference.  What 
were the differences between women and men?  How were they to be 
addressed?  The majority of early feminist legal theorists adopted a 
discrimination model to the issue of gender.  Their objective was to 
outlaw biased treatment and provide laws that allowed women equal 
opportunities with men.10 
This group of feminist legal scholars and practitioners were uneasy 
with too much attention to difference and instead wanted to 
emphasize women’s sameness with men.  Less innovators than 
                                                          
6. See Susan J. Carroll, Gender Symposium, The Politics of Difference: Women 
Public Officials as Agents of Change, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 12-13 (1994) (noting 
the impact women in public office are having on public policies). 
7. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (1998) 
(indicating that the percentage of women enrolled in law school increased from a 
little over nine percent in 1971 to around thirty-four percent by 1981), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/media/factbooks/womenlaw.pdf (last viewed on Nov. 3, 
2004). 
8. See id. at 4 (showing that women have participated in the legal profession in a 
variety of positions, including as judges, practicing attorneys, and professors). 
9. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 95 
(1989) (reasoning that “since a woman’s problems are not hers individually but those 
of women as a whole, they cannot be addressed except as a whole.  In this analysis of 
gender as a nonnatural characteristic of a division of power in society, the personal 
becomes the political”). 
10. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to give “mandatory 
preference” to a man over a woman as executor of an estate). 
3
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entrepreneurs within traditional legal principles, these feminists 
resorted to doctrinal arguments that women and men should be 
treated the same.11  Employing and expanding upon existing equal 
protection jurisprudence, the attack was on differences codified in law 
as well as on the stereotypes that justified them.12  The belief was that 
any recognition of difference or argument for “special treatment” 
would operate to the disadvantage of women.  These feminists 
attacked discriminatory laws that denied women full participation in 
public institutions such as the jury (successful) and the military 
(unsuccessful).13  They challenged financial and market institutions’ 
different treatment in areas like insurance and finance, and used Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make gains in equal treatment in 
access to employment and pay.14  Consistent with the primary 
commitment to equality and gender neutrality, many of the early 
cases were actually brought on behalf of men excluded from women’s 
institutions or complaining about favored treatment for women.15 
Other feminist scholars, however, wanted to develop and build 
upon the concept of gender difference.16  Gender inequality was not 
only produced and maintained through exclusion from or 
discriminatory treatment within existing social structures.  Facially 
neutral rules could also generate inequalities, particularly since 
                                                          
11. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117 
(1979) (noting that the approach of treating men and women equally focuses on the 
unfairness of disparate treatment based solely on sex, which can give meaning to the 
social context of one sex dominating the other). 
12. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (invalidating a 
rule that treated male and female military personnel differently for purposes of 
determining dependent benefits).  To receive the benefits under the statute, female 
personnel were required to prove that their spouses were actually dependents, while 
spouses of male officers were presumed to be dependents.  Id. 
13. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (holding that the federal law 
requiring selective service registration by men, but not women, was constitutional). 
14. See, e.g., Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(finding that Southern Bell violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 
refusing to consider a woman’s application for the position of switchman based on 
gender because the company did not prove that all or substantially all women would 
be unable to perform the duties involved, thereby placing the job within the bona 
fide occupational qualification exception); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 
542, 543 (1971) (holding that a corporation violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 because of a job requirement that female applicants not have preschool age 
children). 
15. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976) (striking down 
legislation that prohibited the sale of 3.2 percent beer to men under the age of 
twenty-one and to women under the age of eighteen because the gender-based 
classification did not bare a fair and substantial relation to the objective of the 
legislation). 
16. See MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 101 (stating that the “differences” 
approach does not “prohibit all differentiations between the sexes, but only those that 
are . . . inaccurate or overgeneralized distinctions between the sexes”). 
4
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women’s and men’s societal circumstances were so different.  Such 
differences demand different treatment – mere formal equal 
treatment could not sufficiently address existing structural and 
ideological inequalities.  This strand of feminism sought to question 
the legitimacy of existing gender norms and their implications for 
society’s institutions and legal structures.  The objective was not 
necessarily to eradicate these norms (a monumental task that has only 
begun), but to address the implications of gendered institutions.  
Institutions, including law were not perceived as neutral and 
potentially helpful in this regard.  They were part of the problem as 
currently constructed. 
This group of scholars and activists, labeled “difference feminists,” 
can be further divided according to how they understood the 
implications of difference.  Some, labeled “cultural feminists,” argued 
that women were different from men and had a unique way of 
“knowing” or feeling.17  For example, cultural feminist arguments 
were particularly significant in developing the movement to replace 
adversariness with mediation and other, gentler, forms of alternative 
dispute resolution. 
By contrast, other arguments that focused on gender differences 
waged broader critiques of certain substantive areas of law.18  These 
attacks were directed at a variety of laws and legal institutions, 
challenging them as illegitimate because they failed to reflect the 
differences between women and men.19 
Recognition that differences between women and men existed 
(whether developed socially or biologically) led some feminists to call 
for law reforms addressing the position of women and the gendered 
nature of their lives.  The argument was that women occupy a 
different and inferior or subordinate position in this society and this 
necessitated “special” concern and responsiveness.20  Existing laws 
                                                          
17. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT CHOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 6-9 (1982) (noting that based on the varied psychological 
development and experience of individuation and relationship, women possess 
different values and ways of interacting with others). 
18. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291-92 
(1987) (upholding a California law that required employers to provide women 
unpaid pregnancy leave and reinstatement after childbirth as a “statute that allows 
women, as well as men, to have families without losing their jobs”).  Justice Marshall’s 
opinion utilized a feminist argument that pregnancy should not be compared to or 
treated as a temporary disability, but instead the Equal Protection issue should be 
decided on the basis of equal treatment of mothers and fathers.  Id. 
19. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1977) (invalidating a 
statute that set minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards because 
it had a discriminatory effect of excluding women). 
20. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 25, 193-213 (asserting that sexual 
harassment denies women the opportunity to choose where to study or work without 
5
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were attacked as reflective of male bias.21  Some commentators went 
so far as to assert that the law itself was male.22 
Such arguments, delegitimizing existing law and structures, 
eventually led to reforms that displaced the traditional (male) 
perspective and effectively transformed the way we think about things 
such as sexual assault and domestic violence.23  Family law was 
another area in which critiques based on the inequity of gender 
differences were effective.  Property division rules at divorce were 
altered in response to the argument that women as homemakers and 
mothers made valuable, even if non-monetary, contributions to the 
family.24  A focus on gender differences also ushered in “new” legal 
concepts such as sexual harassment and the battered women’s 
syndrome.25  Courts began to recognize that a “typical” woman’s 
reaction to an experience of “flirtation” in the workplace or repeated 
threats and actions of violence at home might not be the same as 
those of the law’s construct—the “reasonable man.”26  These changes 
in the law show the success that feminists have achieved in working 
towards challenging the existing nature and structure of the law.  As 
noted over ten years ago in At the Boundaries of the Law, “the task of 
                                                          
being subject to sexual exactions, thereby limiting women in a way that men are not 
limited); see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 4, at 55 (stating that “MacKinnon’s 
argument was straightforward and powerful: Because sexual harassment was a central 
mechanism for perpetuating women’s inferior status in the workplace, it ought to be 
regarded as sex discrimination”). 
21. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) 
(holding that even if, as alleged, female employees were subjected to verbal and 
physical sexual advances from their supervisor, there was no right to relief under the 
Civil Rights Act, where there was no employer policy served by the supervisor’s 
alleged conduct, no benefit to the employer was involved, and no relationship 
between the alleged conduct and the nature of employment).  But see MACKINNON, 
supra note 11, at 38-39 (asserting that men typically engage in sexual harassment 
against women, and because men usually hold superior positions, they have the 
power to affect women’s careers). 
22. See GILLIGAN, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that presumed neutrality gave way 
to the fact that categories of knowledge are human constructions and we have 
become accustomed to seeing life though men’s eyes). 
23. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES 
ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). 
24. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (amended 1973), 9A Part I 
U.L.A. 288 (1998) (including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker in its 
criteria for dividing marital property upon divorce). 
25. See MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 27-28 (noting that the term “sexual 
harassment” came into existence in 1976, but that the previous lack of a social 
definition and silence on the issue did not mean an absence of harassment); Martha 
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36 (1991) (relating how litigators and psychologists developed 
testimony on battered woman syndrome to explain how abuse affects victims). 
26. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling that a 
“sex-blind” reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and ignores the 
experiences of women). 
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feminists concerned with the law and legal institutions must be to 
create and explicate feminist methods and theories that explicitly 
challenge and compete with the existing totalizing nature of grand 
legal theory.”27 
There is a tension between the idea of feminism as a method of 
analysis and gender neutrality or equality as its aspiration.  How can 
the major feminist insight – that women live gendered lives, lives 
shaped by experiences within a society whose institutions and 
ideologies are founded upon and incorporate gendered assumptions 
– be reconciled with the equality paradigm as it is played out in law as 
sameness or equality of treatment?  By and large, there is no 
reconciliation.28  Equality norms and gender neutrality prevail; 
although, there is some minor concession to the realization that 
women’s unequal material circumstances might require some small, 
preferably temporary, concessions.  For example, advocates of 
affirmative action begin with the premise that equality is not only 
desirable, but also attainable.  The point of affirmative action is 
remedial—to ensure equal access and equal opportunity for equally 
distributed meritocracy and ability.30 
In fact, if we look at the areas which take the idea of gender most 
seriously and in which it has had the greatest impact, what emerges is 
an interesting picture.  Sexuality, “domestic” violence, and family law 
are areas that have historically and stereotypically been conceded to 
women or considered to be of special concern to women.31  While 
rape and sexual harassment are “public” events that are sanctioned by 
law and the focus of regulation and policy, unease with both actions is 
the result of the fact that we view them as related to “private” activities 
such as consensual sex and flirtatious seduction.  The idea of gender 
is less visible in situations where we do not view women as victims, as 
                                                          
 27. BOUNDARIES, supra note 1, at xiii. 
28.  Id. 
Feminist legal theory can demonstrate that what is is not neutral.  What is is 
as “biased” as that which challenges it . . . and there can be no refuge in the 
status quo.  Law has developed over time in the context of theories and 
institutions which are controlled by men and reflect their concerns.  
Historically, law has been a “public” arena and its focus has been on public 
concerns.  Traditionally, women belonged to the “private” recesses of society, 
in families, in relationships controlled and defined by men, in silence. 
Id. 
30. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (upholding a provision in 
the Social Security Act that calculated benefits in a more advantageous way for 
women than men, based on the permissible goal of “redressing our society’s 
longstanding disparate treatment of women”). 
31. See MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 73 (noting that “women’s poverty, 
financial dependency, motherhood, and sexual accessibility . . . substantively make up 
women’s status as women”). 
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we do in some cases of rape or domestic violence, or where issues do 
not implicate the domestic sphere of home and family.32  The 
dilemma for a feminist is how to bring a gender-focused analysis to 
bear in the more public and powerful institutional contexts.  How can 
we argue that gender is relevant beyond the sexual, the violent, and 
the familial? 
II.  DECONSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE – ENGAGEMENT WITH LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 
To some extent feminism’s second significant critique – the 
deconstruction of the traditional public/private divide in law – does 
engage the institutions of power.  This attack on the dichotomous 
view of the world resonates with the issue of difference.  This view 
actually can incorporate the major insights of the feminist difference 
dialogue to focus on the gender implications of societal structures.  
This critique is even more important today given the rush to privatize 
so many activities previously considered as public or collective 
responsibility.33 
In fact, it is surprising that some of today’s extreme rhetoric 
extolling private rather than public responsibility for dependency has 
come from self-identified feminist legal scholars and others identified 
with progressive positions.  Some are led to a privatizing position 
through the logic of economic analysis with its emphasis on efficiency 
and utility.34  Of course, feminist theorists come in all ideological 
preferences, but most are at least skeptical about privatization as a 
route of first resort for serious social policy issues.35  In fact, one of 
the few common threads in feminist theory has been woven by 
expanding on the fundamental insight that “the personal is the 
political.”36 Feminists have risen to breach the historic maintenance 
                                                          
32. See id. at 101 (noting that the law of privacy restricts intrusions into the 
private sphere, but it is within this sphere that women are often deprived of identity 
and autonomy). 
33. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1999) (arguing that a more equitable scheme would 
distribute the burdens of dependency, with the market and the state assuming more 
of the economic and social costs inherent in the reproduction of society). 
34. This opinion was expressed by several participants at the Uncomfortable 
Conversation on Children: Public Good and Personal Responsibility?, sponsored by 
the Feminism and Legal Theory Project and held on November 19-20, 1999 at 
Cornell Law School. 
35. See Fineman, supra note 33, at 1211 (discussing the debate about the wisdom 
and effectiveness of using privacy to secure individual rights). 
36.  See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the 
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 535 
(1982) (“[‘The personal is political’] means that women’s distinctive experience as 
women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal - private, 
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of a distinction between the “public” and the “private,” by writing 
volumes to show the interdependence and relationship between these 
“spheres,” demonstrating, for example, the treacherousness of the 
protection of family privacy from a wife or child’s perspective.37 
Of particular relevance to the debates about dependency are 
feminist attempts to show the ways in which the dichotomous 
concepts of public and private have significant political implications.38  
These concepts represent more than mere labels.  They interact as 
ideological channels for the allocation of societal resources, including 
the resources of power and authority.  The concepts have tremendous 
political and practical implications.  Designation of some institutions 
in legal discourse as “public,” while others are considered “private,” 
has implications for the manner and method of state regulation and 
perceived legitimacy of collective subsidy.  This dichotomous 
classification also shapes contrasting norms of interaction and 
expectation within and between the designated societal spheres.39 
The idea that the private is generally preferable under our system of 
government is more and more firmly enmeshed with our sense of 
social justice – enforcing the unwritten “social contract” that guides 
and gauges the relationship among individuals, societal institutions, 
and the state.  As it evolves, our social contract seems to be expanding 
along the private axis.  Privatization is increasingly seen as the solution 
to complicated social problems reflecting persistent inequality and 
poverty.40 
This is the contemporary challenge for feminist legal scholars.  
Many reformers lobby to remove these persistent problems from 
                                                          
emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate - so that what it is to know 
the politics of woman’s situation is to know women’s personal lives.”). 
37. See Fineman, supra note 33, at 1217-20 (discussing the critique of privacy by 
feminists and child advocates including Catharine MacKinnon, Anita L. Allen, and 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse). 
38. See id. at 1223 (arguing that autonomy, an updated version of privacy, if 
extended to caretaker-dependant units would be beneficial to the unit and society); 
see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The 
Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 972 (1991) (concluding that the privacy 
doctrine, as presently conceived, will not extend to protect the decision making 
autonomy and dignity of poor and single mothers). 
39. This is manifest in the historic designation of the “separate spheres” in 
common law.  The family and other institutions of care and altruism occupied the 
private (female) sphere, while the market and state were in the public (male) 
domain.  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 132 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(“God designed the sexes to occupy separate spheres of action and . . . it belonged to 
men to make, apply, and execute the laws . . . .”). 
40. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 608 (2004) (seeking to solve teenage parenting concerns by 
requiring denial of public assistance to teenage parents unless they live with their own 
parents). 
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public control and relegate them to the sphere of private industry.  
“From welfare reform to the construction of ideal educational or 
prison systems, the assertion is that the private market can better 
address historic public issues than can the public government.”41 
We must point out that the classification of the world into public 
and private contains some significant paradoxes.  For example, while 
the state is designated the quintessential public and the family as the 
quintessential private institution, the market and its apparatus are 
distinctively chameleon-like.  Markets are constructed as public (and 
therefore under a different, competitive set of norms) when 
contrasted with the family, but as private (and therefore not easily 
susceptible to public regulation) when paired with the state.  The 
market reaps the best of both spheres. 
In addition, while the family may be viewed as private, it is highly 
regulated and controlled by the state.  Law defines who may marry 
whom and what formalities must be observed.42  Only some 
relationships are “legitimate” or “legal” ones, which carry the weight 
of the state behind them.  Law defines the consequences of marriage 
and parenthood during on-going relationships and imposes 
significant policy directives in the context of divorce.43  Law also 
defines the responsibilities of a family and the role of the family 
within the larger society.44 
So too, the public nature of the state spills over to affect the very 
workings of private life.  The state always acts in ways that affect 
individuals.  By shaping and regulating institutions such as the family, 
the state contributes to the way individuals construct their identities 
within society.  The state establishes norms of citizenship and 
community.  By scooping out what is public, it also defines what 
remains private.  It is on this terrain that feminism can confront the 
politics and policies stingily constructed in the discourse of the Law 
                                                          
41. Martha Albertson Fineman, Symposium on the Structures of Care Work, 
Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2001) (arguing for the assertion 
of collective or public responsibility for dependency, a status that historically has been 
assigned to the private sphere). 
42. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (noting that marriage is a 
social relation subject to the state’s police power (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 
(1888))). 
43. See Williams v. N.C., 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945) (stating that divorce and 
marriage affect “personal rights of the deepest significance.  It also touches basic 
interests of society.  Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status, every 
consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should be the same wherever 
the question arises”). 
44. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the 
Family in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 400 (1993) (discussing the 
construction of family function in society and the distribution of roles within the family to 
meet those assigned functions). 
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and Economics movement. 
Feminism is linked to the real world, therefore feminism changes 
and evolves. In the introduction to one of the first anthologies of 
feminist legal theory, I noted this evolutionary nature of feminist legal 
theory: 
Feminist methodology at its best represents a contribution to a 
series of ongoing debates and discussion which take as a given that 
“truth” changes over time as circumstances change and that gains 
and losses, along with wisdom recorded, are not immutable but part 
of an evolving story. Feminist legal theory referencing women’s 
lives, then, must define and undertake the “tasks of the moment.” 
As the tasks of the future cannot yet be defined, any particular piece 
of feminist legal scholarship is only a step in the long journey 
feminist legal scholars have begun.45 
 
                                                          
45. BOUNDARIES, supra note 1, at xv. 
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